Atheism Is Not Fundamentalist

In the current philosophical debates on religion, most respected apologists realize that there is no way to justify religious belief. Instead, the focus is on trying to reduce the foundations of everyday belief.

Essentially, they argue "Yes. I have no reason to believe in God. But YOU have no reason to believe the world. So our beliefs are, in fact, on equal ground."

Little do the religious nuts who espouse this belief know, they're right. They aren't right for the reasons they think, though. They think that they've reduced our perceptions to a fundamentalist belief, but they haven't.

Our sensations are forced upon us. They are us. I (Aaron) am my sensations. I am my beliefs. I am a complex construct that includes beliefs and sensations. I have no reason to believe that sensations are true in some metaphysical sense, they simply are.

For example, my sensations are frequently "wrong." I say wrong in quotes because right and wrong are subjective based on experience. For example, I might look off in the distance and see a tall man, but when I get close to him, I find out that he is, in fact, short. We would say that I was wrong in my initial conception of his height. But I wasn't. At that moment, I saw a short man. That's the only truth that there is.

We can try to argue that there exists some truth outside of our perception, and I actually find that somewhat compelling, if not really cogent, but we can never achieve that. Whereas religious believers feel that they are right, I do not. I am keenly aware that what I see is not a foundation for truth.

If we assume the existence of other minds*, our perceptions are above religious dogma. Not only are they forced upon us -we do not choose to see- but they are highly reliable from person to person. When I seek scientific support for a belief, I can point to the evidence and others will agree that I am pointing at evidence. Religion absolutely does not have this.

If we assume that we have no reason to assume other minds, and their testimony is useless to determine justification, thus returning our perceptions and faith to similar grounds, we are forced into absolute skepticism. At that point, yes, our confidence in our senses is zeroed, but our confidence in anything is zeroed. The religious have reduced their own beliefs to meaninglessness. They are still fools for believing their creed.

But even here, I am not a fool for believing my sensations. They are the only thing that I have. They are imperfect, but they are something. The reason why religious arguments are correct is because science and antitheism are dogmatic in that they hold that truth is good, non-truth is bad. This is a dogma.

There is good reason for this dogma, though. Namely, truth and belief are the wellspring from which our action flows. We don't know what truth is, since we are limited by our senses in determining it, but it is the best course we have. For example, if someone throws an orange at me, I will duck. My sensations told me "it is true that an orange is flying at you." I act based upon that, and I do not feel pain.

But since our sensations cannot be trusted, we might have been hit by the orange and not known it. We don't KNOW. We don't know if we're actually acting. The argument is vaguely circular, in that we're relying on sensation to confirm the validity of our sensations. But to deny our sensations pushes us, again, into absolute skepticism.

And, again, that absolute skepticism reduces religion to the same position of non-justification. I might be a fool, but you're an even bigger one because you believe more unjustified things than I do.

So, yes, atheism, antitheism, and science are predicated on the dogmatic belief that truth is better than non-truth. Everyone recognizes that the best we can really hope for is justification, and that justification is a circular system based upon reciprocal validation of sensations. But while the scientific argument falls apart on "Yes. I would duck if an orange was thrown at me," religion broke down LONG before that. As far as I'm concerned, science is way better off.

*: I've talked about this before. Other minds is the problem that we do not know that other people have internal worlds similar to our own. For all we know, they are advanced robots programmed to act like humans. The assumption that others have minds seems to be inborn, as experiments continue to indicate. This is the root of our ability to "get inside someone else's shoes." It's guessed that those who lack this inborn mechanism (or mental organ or module, whichever term you like) are what we call autistic.

Why I Find Creationism Emotionally Hollow

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Ponderings on Truth

Truth is something that can never be attained. That's obvious to me. Mathematical and logical truths are not truths, they are tautologies. Two and two equal four in the same way that the reverse is "true."

I'm instead focusing on what a proposition must have in order to be true. We can not achieve a complete account of a true statement, but we can at least say that a statement is definitely not true if such-and-such a requirement is not met.

I actually go way back to the verification principle. Remember, this is only a metric we're using to toss out things that are necessarily not true. If a proposition cannot be verified, it is not true. It isn't false, and it might actually turn out to be true, but until it is verifiable, we cannot label it as "true."

The proposition must be both internally and externally consistent. Internally means that the basic elements of the statement do not contradict. Externally means that other statements outside of the proposition that have not been shown to be necessarily not true do not contradict the proposition.

The statement must be meaningfully believable. By this, it must fulfill the first two requirements and also be understandable in some linguistically non-nebulous way. Two types of propositions can be meaningfully believable: internal and external. External propositions correspond to something in empirical reality. "Dog," or "el perro" correspond to dogs. "The dog is running" corresponds to the sight of a dog running. "The dog is an odd number" is not meaningfully believable because no dogs are odd numbers. All external propositions must be empirically verifiable to be called true.

Internal propositions correspond to things that are only apparent to the logical entity speaking the proposition. "me so horny" has two meanings. The speaker means that they are experiencing certain things that they associate with the word horny. The listener is seeing certain behavior that they associate with the word horny and other people. As such, propositions that don't appear to be logically tied with something actually are, it just depends on where that thing is. For example, when I declare "oh shit!" that statement is logically tied and represents sensations that I am feeling.

This is where other minds come in. We make the assumption that other people's internal worlds are at least similar to our own. As such, we project our internal world on other people. There are likely very many evolutionary reasons for this, not the least of which is empathy. So when somewhen says "me so horny," we don't say that this person is behaving in a way that I usually behave when horny, or in a way that frequently ends up with them copulating. No, we say, with great assurance, that they feel horny. We state that we know what's going on inside their head.

But even here, it's an unfounded assumption. For example, if someone frequently said "me so horny," but sex was never correlated with this statement, it might take awhile, but we would stop assuming that their internal world was the same as ours. The empirical information would reveal itself to be the true determinant of our assumptions about someone's internal world.

As you can see, I dodge neo-Wittgenstein by not regarding atomic elements of propositions as directly corresponding to "things," only the propositions themselves. All propositions correspond to something. Unlike words, we can definitely define a proposition.

Where the disconnect happens is the internal/external difference. Sometimes, we as listeners can never truly be sure of to what a proposition corresponds. "Oh shit!" could correspond to fear, or elation. We rely on context to help make this determination, but the speaker knows precisely to what the proposition corresponds.

Obviously, I can say this with confidence because I am making an assumption. I am assuming that other minds exist and that they are similar to me. I say "oh shit" very frequently, and I am quite aware of what this statement logically represents, even though other people are not. That does not change the fact that it does definitely represent something, and I know what that is. That means, under my assumption, that other people's statements who's logical foundation is not available to me nonetheless have a logically specific foundation, even if I don't know what that is.

As such, if a statement cannot be shown to represent something internal or something external, it cannot be true.

What is Truth.

I've been tangling with the concept of truth, recently, for a book I'm working on (a philosopher? Writing a book? Shocker!). Correspondence theory is the theory that most academics accept or at least lean towards. Even there, leaning is hardly an endorsement. Basically, correspondence theory states that propositions can be true or false (grass is green) depending on if they correspond to reality.

But what is reality? If reality is determined wholly by our senses, then I see very little difference between the correspondence theory and pragmatic truth. It's in there where my mind is spending its time. Pragmatic theory is so much more powerful than I once gave it credit for.

Pragmatic theory says that a proposition is true if it's useful. Sounds almost silly, but the theory's strength lies in the definition of useful. For example, believing that God exists might make someone feel better, but that is not useful. A proposition must be usable to achieve other propositions that are themselves useful.

For example, I believe "there is a pen on my table." If correspondence theory is true, simply seeing the pen confirms that. But imagine that it's a hologram. I reach out and get nothing but air. Then, suddenly, I have two contradictory perceptions. Which one corresponds to reality? I don't think that it's answerable! The pen might be an illusion, or I might be missing when I reach. My hand might be an illusion. I can't tell.

But pragmatic theory is much better. "There is a pen on my table" is true if, acting upon that belief, I am able to achieve other things. If I need to write something, and I act upon the belief and reach out for the pen, and, indeed, successfully write something, my belief was true. If I try to act on that belief and fail to write something, the belief was not true.

That's powerful! It works with the scientific method very well, because confirmation is central to science, obviates correspondence theory (if we assume that reality is sense perception), and achieves what truth theory should achieve: giving us something to work with.